And Now for a Moment of Silence: \u3cem\u3eWallace v. Jaffree\u3c/em\u3e by Penneys, Sylvia Sohn
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 39 Number 5 Article 6 
9-1-1985 
And Now for a Moment of Silence: Wallace v. Jaffree 
Sylvia Sohn Penneys 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Sylvia Sohn Penneys, And Now for a Moment of Silence: Wallace v. Jaffree, 39 U. Miami L. Rev. 935 
(1985) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol39/iss5/6 
This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
CASENOTES
And Now for a Moment of Silence: Wallace
v. Jaffree
I. FACTS OF THE CASE ..................................................... 935
II. B ACKGROUND ........................................................... 937
A . The Controversy ................................................... 938
B. Analysis of Establishment Clause Cases ............................. 940
C . P recedents ........................................................ 944
III. THE CASE OF W allace v. Jafiree ......................................... 948
A . A n alysis .......................................................... 948
B . S ignifi cance ....................................................... 95 1
IV . C ONCLUSION ............................................................ 955
I. FACTS OF THE CASE
Ishmael Jaffree protested in vain to teachers and school offi-
cials about the daily recitation of prayers in his children's elemen-
tary schools.1 Finding the classroom prayers "offensive," and una-
1. The facts were taken from Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985); Jaffree v. Wal-
lace, 705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983); Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. 1104
(S.D. Ala. 1983); Jaffree v. James, 544 F. Supp. 727 (S.D. Ala. 1982).
In one child's classroom, the teacher led the children in the following prayer:
God is great, God is good,
Let us thank him for our food,
Bow our heads we all are fed,
Give us Lord our daily bread.
Amen!
Jafree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1107.
In the second child's classroom, the teacher led the children in reciting the following
phrase:
God is great, God is good,
Let us thank him for our food.
Id. The same teacher also had the children recite the Lord's Prayer.
In the third child's classroom, the teacher led her class in singing the following:
For health and strength and daily food,
we praise thy name, Oh Lord.
Id.
All these teachers were aware of Mr. Jaffree's protestations, as were the school adminis-
trators. The school administrators discussed the problem with the teachers, but did not ask
them to discontinue the religious practices. Id. at 1107-08.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ble to halt the practice, Jaffree filed suit on behalf of three of his
minor children. 2 In the initial complaint, Jaffree sought declaratory
and injunctive relief for violation of the establishment clause of the
first amendment,3 and named as defendants the children's teach-
ers, school officials, and the school board of Mobile County,
Alabama.
In an amended complaint Jaffree alleged that three Alabama
statutes were violative of the establishment clause and named as
defendants the State Board of Education, the Attorney General,
and the Governor of Alabama.4 One of the Alabama statutes, sec-
tion 16-1-20, enacted in 1978, provides that teachers "shall an-
nounce" a one minute or less period of silence "for meditation. '
Section 16-1-20.1, enacted in 1982, provides that teachers "may an-
nounce" a one minute or less period of silence for "meditation or
voluntary prayer." Section 16-1-20.2, also enacted in 1982, pro-
vides for teachers to lead "willing students" in a prayer.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama applied the Lemon test s and found sufficient merit to the
constitutional challenge of sections 16-1-20.1 and 16-1-20.2 to
grant a preliminary injunction.9 The court did not find the same
"potential infirmity" with section 16-1-20.10 At the trial on the
2. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1106.
3. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech,
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Govern-
ment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
4. Jaifree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1108.
5. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20 (Supp. 1985). See infra note 104 for the full text of the statute.
6. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.1 (Supp. 1985). See infra note 103 for the full text of the
statute.
7. ALA. CODE § 16-1-20.2 (Supp. 1985). Section 16-1-20.2 in full provides:
From henceforth, any teacher or professor in any public educational institu-
tion within the state of Alabama, recognizing that the Lord God is one, at the
beginning of any homeroom or any class, may pray, may lead willing students in
prayer, or may lead the willing students in the following prayer to God:
Almighty God, You alone are our God. We acknowledge You as the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the world. May Your Justice, Your truth, and Your peace
abound this day in the hearts of our countrymen, in the counsels of our govern-
ment, in the sanctity of our homes and in the classroom of our schools in the
name of the Lord. Amen.
Id.
8. See infra text accompanying note 56.
9. 544 F. Supp. 727. Although it thought the Supreme Court was mistaken in interpret-
ing the establishment clause, the district court bowed to the oath of office and stare decisis
when it analyzed the issue. Id. at 732-33.
10. 544 F. Supp. at 732. "[T]here is nothing wrong with a little meditation and quiet-
ness." Id. Appellees subsequently dropped the claims against § 16-1-20, and thereby re-
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merits, the district court reviewed the constitutional history of the
establishment clause and concluded that the establishment clause
"was intended only to prohibit the federal government from estab-
lishing a national religion."11 After the court's further finding that
the fourteenth amendment 12 "did not incorporate the first amend-
ment against the states," 3 Jaifree was left without a recognizable
claim. The district court had severed the nonstatutory 4 from the
statutory claims'8 and dismissed both cases, dissolving the previ-
ously entered injunction."6
Jaffree applied for a stay pending appeal, which was granted
by Justice Powell, as Circuit Justice for the Eleventh Circuit.'7 The
Eleventh Circuit, on appeal, reversed the substantive holding of
the district court.'8 It emphasized the preeminent role of the Su-
preme Court as "the final arbiter of Constitutional disputes"'l and
corrected the district court's misapplication of the doctrine of stare
decisis2  On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States held,
affirmed: Section 16-1-20.1 violated the first amendment's prohibi-
tion against a governmental establishment of religion. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479 (1985).
II. BACKGROUND
Jaffree, more than most cases, needs perspective: its signifi-
cance lies as much in what it does not say as in what it does. Fa-
moved the pure moment of silence statute from Supreme Court consideration. 105 S. Ct. at
2481 n.1.
11. Jaifree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1118.
12. U.S. CONST. amend XIV.
13. Jaifree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1119.
14. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1106.
15. Jaffree v. James, 554 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (S.D. Ala. 1983).
16. Id.
17. Jaifree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 459 U.S. 1314 (1983). The United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit previously denied Jaifree's motion for a stay and injunc-
tion pending appeal. Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d at 1528.
18. 705 F.2d 1526. The Eleventh Circuit ordered consolidation of the severed actions.
Id. at 1529 n.2. The circuit court used the Lemon test and found that both the statutes and
the nonstatutory prayer activities violated the establishment clause. Id. at 1533-36.
19. Id. at 1536.
20. Id. at 1532. Stare decisis is an appropriate doctrine when a court is dealing with its
own decisions; it does "not apply where a lower court is compelled to apply the precedent of
a higher court." Id. (citing 20 AM. Ju 2d Courts § 183 (1965)). The circuit court denied the
petition for rehearing. Jaifree v. Wallace, 713 F.2d 614 (11th Cir. 1983). The Supreme Court
denied the petition for certiorari on the nonstatutory school prayer practices. Wallace v.
Jaffree, 104 S. Ct. 1704 (1984). The Court affirmed the circuit court, finding § 16-1-20.2
unconstitutional, and noted probable jurisdiction on the remaining issue, the constitutional-
ity of section § 16-1-20.1. Id.
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miliarity with the unspoken possibilities - what the court could
have said but did not - adds dimension to the apparent simplicity
of the decision. Thus the brief majority opinion takes form against
a backdrop of establishment clause controversy, analysis, and case
law.
A. The Controversy
Controversy over the proper relationship between church and
state has inspired furious debate among the Justices, commenta-
tors, and the American people.2 1 Not surprisingly, Supreme Court
decisions in this area have evoked derision, 22 consternation, 23 and
open rebellion.2' One need only have a passing familiarity with his-
tory and current events to know the fervor generated by religious
resolve. This fervor is particularly intense among those who per-
ceive the role of religion as steadily diminishing in the United
States. The result for some is a strong emotional commitment to
safeguarding the traditional role of religion in national life, includ-
ing government support and economic aid to religion.25 Influenced
by this view of the role of religion, and unwilling to invalidate the
traditional forms of support, the Supreme Court in some cases has
21. Although there is an endless list of books and articles that could be cited in this
area, the four books which follow, when read together, give an overview: CHURCH AND STATE:
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (P. Kurland ed. 1975) (trenchant analysis
of Supreme Court decisions on the first amendment by well-known commentators); R. MOR-
GAN, THE SUPREME COURT AND RELIGION (1972) (description of the inherited attitudes on
religion and law of early American settlers, the development of attitudes through Supreme
Court cases, and the arguments of noted constitutional law scholars); F. SORAUP, THE WALL
OF SEPARATION (1976) (detailed description of litigation on church-state issues from 1951-
1974, including identification of the litigants, lawyers, and judges); S. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (1970) (discussion of the problem and impact of noncompliance
with Court decisions).
22. Justice Burger commented derisively, "[t]he mountains have labored and brought
forth a mouse." 105 S. Ct. at 2508. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Horace, Epistles, bk. 3
(Ars Poetica), line 139). See also Van Alstyne, Friends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jeffer-
son's Crumbling Wall - A Comment on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770, 783 n.44
("not every gross practice will be sustained") (emphasis added)).
23. Senator Robert Byrd was concerned by Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962): "Can it
be that we, too, are ready to embrace the foul concept of atheism?" L. PFEFFER, GOD, CAE-
SAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION 201 (1975).
24. The district court refused to defer to the preeminence of the Supreme Court in
constitutional interpretation. Jaffree v. Board of School Comm'rs, 554 F. Supp. at 1104. See
generally S. WASEY, supra note 21.
25. Justice Douglas cited a long list of government support and financial aid for reli-
gion, all of which he considered unconstitutional. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 437 n.1 (Doug-
las, J., concurring); see also Kauper, Tax Exemption for Religious Activities in THE WALL
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE 95 (D. Oaks, ed. 1963) (citing traditional practice as an expla-
nation for the constitutionality of tax exemptions).
[Vol. 39:935
WALLACE v. JAFFREE
made tradition itself grounds for refusing to invalidate government
support for religion."'
Arrayed against those who wish to acknowledge the role of re-
ligion in American society by an "accommodation" of religion 27 are
those who see history and current events as absolute proof of the
need for a "wall of separation" between church and state.2 8 Influ-
enced by this view, the Supreme Court in some cases has refused
to countenance even "minor encroachments" on the establishment
clause, seeing any encroachment as a first step toward the disman-
tling of the wall.29 Adherents of the latter philosophy have been
referred to as "separationists,"30 those who take the former view
have been called "accommodationists." 1 This fundamental disa-
greement on the appropriate church-state relationship is at the
heart of every establishment clause dispute.
The dispute is compounded in some cases by this country's
equally strong emotional commitment to education.3 2 The special
place of religion in American life combined with the "special place
of public schools in American life" 33 has made school prayer cases
distinguishable from other establishment clause cases. 34 The Court
26. See, e.g., Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (tradition supported the Court's
finding of constitutionality of the practice of employing chaplains to start each legislative
session with a prayer); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 677-80 (1970) (tradition sup-
ported the Court's finding of constitutionality of tax exemption for religious institutions).
27. See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S.
Ct. 1355, 1359-61; Marsh, 463 U.S. 783; Walz, 397 U.S. at 671-74; see also Kauper, supra
note 25.
28. In Everson v. Board of Educ., the Court quoted Thomas Jefferson's famous meta-
phor about the first amendment "building a wall of separation between church and state."
330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), which
quoted Thomas Jefferson's letter to the Danbury Baptist Association). Everson was the case
which incorporated the establishment clause into the fourteenth amendment. 330 U.S. at 5.
The Court's adoption of Thomas Jefferson's views on church-state relations set the tone for
subsequent cases. Mark DeWolfe Howe disputed the Court's assumption that the first
amendment codified Jefferson's wall metaphor with its antireligious implications and pos-
ited in its place Roger Williams's "wall," which was intended to protect religion from the
state. M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-12 (1965).
29. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Engel, 370 U.S. at 436-
37.
30. L. PFEFFER, RELIGION, STATE, AND THE BURGER COURT xi (1984).
31. Id.
32. Justice Frankfurter described the fierceness of denominational conflicts in early
American schools. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 214-15 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). See generally L. PFEFFER, supra note 23.
33. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14, at 825 (1978).
34. Notes, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 364, 379 (1983) ("Strict standards of church-state separation are applied to
the public schools .... "). For a low-key, common sense discussion of school prayers, see P.
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has been particularly protective of primary and secondary
schools.3 5 The Court has explained its special protectiveness by
noting both the impressionability of children 6 and the policy of
compulsory school attendance.3 7 Professor Tribe finds it "unsur-
prising that no major religious activity, however 'voluntary,' has
been allowed to take place in the facilities through which we incul-
cate values for the future."3
B. Analysis of Establishment Clause Cases
Analytically, the hallmark of the establishment clause cases
has been the lack of consistency in the Court's approach to the
various problems of church-state relations."' In large measure, the
inconsistency has arisen from inherent tension between the estab-
lishment clause and the free exercise clause. The tension mirrors
the fundamental disagreement over the church-state relationship. 0
The potential for conflict that exists in the majority of religion
cases would be realized if the Court were to give a broad reading to
FREUND, THE LEGAL ISSUE IN RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 13-24 (1965).
35. See Howard, Up the Against the Wall: The Uneasy Separation of Church and
State, in CHURCH, STATE, AND POLITICS 16-21 (J. Hensel ed. 1981) (Final Report of the 1981
Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in the United States). Commentator
Howard distinguished lower schools from colleges in aid-to-education cases. Compare Mc-
Collom, 333 U.S. 203 (finding religious instruction on public school grounds repugnant to
the Constitution) with Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (finding a university regula-
tion prohibiting the use of its facilities for religious worship or teaching repugnant to the
Constitution).
36. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274.
37. McCollum, 333 U.S. at 209-10, 212.
38. L. TRIBE, supra note 33, at 825; Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment,
and Doctrinal Development, Part II: The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARv. L. REv.
513, 569-70 (1968) ("On the lower levels of education the immaturity of the students
presents a possibly insurmountable problem and also raises the difficult questior of whether
the public elementary schools should explore the things that separate the groups within the
community rather than those things which they hold in common." (footnotes omitted)).
39. Richard Morgan, a political scientist, noted that the Court's difficulty in rational-
izing religion clause decisions has resulted in a diminishing legitimacy for its decisions. R.
MORGAN, supra note 21, at 2. But cf. Johnson, Concepts and Compromise in First Estab-
lishment Religious Doctrine, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 839 (1984) ("Doctrinally, first amend-
ment religion law is a mess," but the inconsistency may indicate a real attempt to tread "a
careful path between undue preference for religion . . .and undue hostility to it," and
thereby "keep the peace between strong contending factions .. "). Compare, e.g., McCol-
lom, 333 U.S. at 203 (holding religious instruction in the classrooms during school hours is a
violation of the establishment clause) with Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (holding
release of students during school hours to participate in religious education off-campus is a
permissible "accommodation" of religion).
40. For a discussion of the two views of the church-state relationship, see also supra
text accompanying notes 25-31.
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each clause."' If the free exercise clause were interpreted to require
the government to accommodate every religious practice, and the
establishment clause were interpreted to prohibit any government
aid to religion, then obedience to one clause would entail violation
of the other. The Court has partially avoided this conflict by re-
stricting free exercise clause cases to those situations in which gov-
ernment action actually burdened a religious observance or belief.
42
Less successfully, the Court has attempted to reconcile the
two clauses by steering a course of absolute neutrality, neither en-
couraging nor impeding religion.43 The Court at times has inter-
preted neutrality as meaning that government may offer no aid to
religion." The Court at other times has interpreted neutrality as
requiring the accommodation of an admittedly religious practice. 5
When a religious practice or observance is burdened by a govern-
ment action, accommodation of the practice or observance can be
explained as an exception to the establishment clause directive not
to promote religion in favor of the free exercise clause directive not
to interfere with the free exercise of religion.40 But when there has
41. Both religion clauses are "cast in absolute terms" and, "if expanded to a logical
extreme," would conflict. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669-70. Cf. L. TRinE, supra note 33, at 833-35
(In any conflict between the clauses, the free exercise clause should dominate so that reli-
gious toleration will prevail.); Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: Rec-
onciling the Conflict, 41 U. PITT. L. REv. 673, 675 (1980) (The conflict between the establish-
ment clause and the free exercise clause can be resolved by interpreting the establishment
clause to "forbid only government action whose purpose is solely religious and that is likely
to impair religious freedom by coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs.").
42. "[I]t is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion." Schempp, 374 U.S. at
223. But cf. Everson 330 U.S. at 16 (suggesting that excluding parochial schools from the
benefits of state-mandated bus fare reductions for school children might run afoul of the
free exercise clause).
43. See, e.g., Everson, 330 U.S. at 18; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 215, 217-22. Many com-
mentators have suggested that a proper reading of the religion clauses would result in the
conclusion that government must be neutral with respect to religion. Foremost in this group
is Philip Kurland who argued that the clauses "must be read to mean that religion may not
be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action." P. KURLAND, RELi-
GION AND THE LAW 17-18 (1961). Wilber Katz agreed with Kurland that government must be
neutral, but posited that neutrality requires that religion be used as a basis for classifica-
tion. W. KATz, RELIGION AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS (1964). See also Gianella, supra note
38, at 513, 519 (calling Kurland's neutrality "outmoded" by "increased governmental regula-
tion" but using it as a "point of departure" for a more sophisticated analysis).
44. Johnson, supra note 39, at 818.
45. Id. at 819. The Court first mentioned accommodation in Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-
14. Subsequently, the Court alluded to it in Walz, 397 U.S. at 673, and Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at
1359-60. See generally Buchanan, Accommodation of Religion in the Public Schools: A Plea
for Careful Balancing of Competing Constitutional Values, 28 UCLA L. REv. 1000 (1981).
46. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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been no burdensome government action, then accommodation is a
constitutionally inexplicable violation of the establishment
clause.
47
A second analytical problem is the lack of a "precisely drawn"
guideline for applying the religion clauses. The Court noted that:
"the purpose [of the Framers] was to state an objective not to
write a statute."' 8 Attempts to define the religion clauses have pro-
voked discussion on both their meaning49 and purpose.50 In partic-
ular, constitutional authorities on and off the Court have disagreed
on the content"' and appropriate role of history52 in constitutional
47. Commentators have developed various explanations for "nonconstitutional accom-
modation," but the Court has not. G. Sidney Buchanan made a may-must distinction: when
free exercise is involved, the court must accommodate the practice, but even where free
exercise is not involved, the Court may consider accommodation as part of its establishment
clause inquiry. Buchanan, supra note 45, at 1011-17. Donald Giannella described neutrality
as involving both a "free exercise neutrality" and a "political neutrality" which "recognizes
that religious associations operate in the temporal realm and accordingly can be legitimately
included among the beneficiaries of the prevailing order established and sustained by the
state." Gianella, supra note 38, at 519 (footnote omitted). Alan Schwarz pointed out, how-
ever, that a nonconstitutionally mandated free exercise exception is not consistent with a
no-aid interpretation of the establishment clause, because the value of aiding religion cannot
possibly excuse the unconstitutional act of aiding religion. Schwarz, No Imposition of Reli-
gion The Establishment Clause, 77 YALE L.J. 692, 707 (1968).
48. Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
49. Commentators have come up with some creative approaches to defining the religion
clauses. Phillip Johnson concluded that there is no consistent meaning to the religion
clauses. The Court's interpretation, he suggested, reflects ideological bias and attempts to
avoid religious conflict through neutrality. Johnson, supra note 39, at 845. John Mansfield
argued that the answer to the meaning of the religion clauses lies in an examination of the
philosophy of the Constitution and that all the Court has done to this point is to attempt to
evade that task. Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philoso-
phy of the Constitution, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 847, 848 (1984). A note writer explained the
religion clauses as providing "choice and plurality [which] enable the self to develop both
separate and collective aspects." Note, Reinterpreting the Religion Clauses: Constitutional
Construction and Conceptions of Self, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1468, 1475 (1984). Sidney Hook
took a typical philosopher's approach when he defined the clauses by discussing what reli-
gious freedom means. S. HOOK, RELIGION IN A FREE SOCIETY 27-41 (1967). See also supra
notes 41 & 43.
50. Compare Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1361 (Burger, C.J.) (quoting Joseph Story: "The real
object of the [First] Amendment . . . was to prevent any national ecclesiastical establish-
ment, which should give to an hierarchy the exclusive patronage of the national govern-
ment." 3 STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 (1833)),
with McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 441-42 (1961) (Warren C.J.) ("But the First
Amendment, in its final form, did not simply bar a congressional enactment establishing a
church; it forbade all laws respecting an establishment of religion.").
51. Compare Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (citing the leading role of Thomas Jefferson in the
drafting of the first amendment to show the value of his opinion in interpreting it), with
Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (pointing out that Jefferson was in
France when the first amendment was passed and ratified, and that his role, therefore, could
not have been central).
52. Raoul Berger asserted that it is vital to be guided by the "original intention" in
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analysis. The Court's inconsistent interpretation of the nebulous
religion clauses, combined with the Court's disagreement on the
role of history, recently has led the Court to question whether the
standard establishment clause test is an accurate expression of
doctrine5 3 and has heightened the perception that no one test
could suffice in all cases. 4
Since 1971, the Court has used the Lemon test as the standard
establishment clause analytical tool. It was first articulated in
Lemon v. Kurtzman:
55
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the
cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years.
Three such tests may be gleaned from our cases. First, the stat-
ute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive gov-
ernment entaglement with religion." '
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger offered the test as re-
sponsive "to the three main evils against which the Establishment
Clause was intended to afford protection: 'sponsorship, financial
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activ-
ity.' ",57 Disappointing the optimism of its initial articulation, the
order to maintain "security for a consistent and stable government ... ." R. BERGER, Gov-
ERNMENT By JUDICIARY 364 (1977). Robert Cord charged that "tremendous damage" to
church-state relations can be wrought by "erroneous history" and decisions based on it. R.
CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT FICTION 145 (1977).
Pierre Schlag took a different view; he argued that the framer's intent is unknowable, and
should not be determinative: the "one legitimate role" is to "situate constitutional deci-
sion[s]." Schlag, Framers Intent: The Illegitimate Uses of History, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 283, 287 (1985). John Wofford saw the inherent difficulties in determining the intent,
meaning, and purpose of constitutional provisions. He suggested that an investigation of the
history of the Constitution may be illuminating but cannot be binding. Wofford, The Blind-
ing Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502
passim (1964).
53. See, e.g., Lynch, 104 S. Ct. at 1366-67 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also Johnson,
supra note 30, at 827-31; Mansfield, supra note 49, at 848 (viewing the Lemon test as an
"incantation of verbal formulae devoid of explanatory value').
54. See Lynch, 104 S. Ct. 1355.
55. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
56. Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). For a more thorough examination of the Lemon
test, see Case Comment, A Breach in the Impregnable Wall: An Analysis of Tuition Tax
Credits and the Establishment Clause, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 903, 905-13 (1984); Recent
Developments, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause
Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175 (1984).
57. 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 668). Compare Chief Justice Burger's
statement about the purpose of the establishment clause in Lemon, with the one he gave in
1985]
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Lemon test proved unequal to the task of providing real guidelines
for the difficult problem of determining what government aid could
be given to parochial schools without violating the establishment
clause." The Court made irreconcilable distinctions in these
school-aid cases which provided ample opportunity for the dispar-
agement of the Lemon test."
C. Precedents
More consistent and far more controversial than the parochial
school-aid cases, are the school prayer cases, es Engle v. Vitale"'
and School District v. Schempp.e In terms of factual similarity,
these two cases, decided over twenty years ago, are the immediate
precedents for Jaffree. The challenged practice in Engel was the
daily classroom recitation of a state-authorized nondenominational
prayer,6 s general enough to be described by one commentator as
addressed "To Whom It May Concern.""' The Court found that
the nondenominational character of the prayer and the voluntary
participation of students did not save the statutory prayer from
unconstitutionality.6
In Schempp, the Court followed the logic of Engel and found
that the establishment clause prohibited the reading of the Bible
or the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public classrooms." In
both cases, the Court maintained that it had taken a "neutral" po-
Lynch. See supra note 50.
58. Choper, supra note 41, at 680.
59. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. at 2518-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Choper, supra note 41, at
680-81; Howard, supra note 35, at 21.
60. Sidney Hook insisted that school-aid is really the "momentous issue" in the
church-state relationship. The Court, he believed, had over-reacted to "inconsequential reli-
gious exercises," unnecessarily "outraging the local pieties." S. HOOK, supra note 49, at 108-
09. The result, he warned, has been a revitalization of parochial schools with a concommi-
tant weakening of the public school system which had "helped to forge a united nation." Id.
at 111.
61. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
62. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
63. 370 U.S. at 422-23.
64. S. HooK, supra note 49, at 80; see also P. FREUND, supra note 34, at 13 (using the
same phrase).
65. 370 U.S. 430-31. "It is neither sacrilegious nor antireligious to say that each sepa-
rate government in this country should stay out of the business of writing or sanctioning
official prayers and leave that purely religious function to the people themselves and to
those the people choose to look to for religious guidance." Id. at 435 (footnote omitted).
66. 374 U.S. at 223. Allowing these practices, the Court said, would mean that "a ma-
jority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs." Id. at 226.
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sition on religion, 7 a view hotly disputed by many."8
Perhaps the furious reaction to Engel and Schempp was what
influenced the Court to wait over twenty years before accepting
another school prayer case; or perhaps the Court believed
Schempp adequately represented the last word on the subject of
school prayer." In fact, the majority opinion in Schempp made a
conscious effort to summarize prior establishment clause doctrine
in the form of the secular purpose and primary effect analysis sub-
sequently adopted in Lemon. 0 Presumably, the Court in Schempp
was hoping to formulate establishment clause guidelines for the
lower courts and legislatures that would obviate the need for the
Supreme Court's further involvement in the school prayer issue.
Although Engel and Schempp provided the doctrinal back-
ground for the school prayer issue, it was the recent cases of Marsh
v. Chambers71 and Lynch v. Donnelly7 that provided the more im-
mediate context, indicating the Court's probable direction and the
future of the Lemon test.73 In Marsh v. Chambers, the Court for
the first time refused to use the Lemon test.7 ' The Court was faced
with the inevitable finding that the Nebraska legislature had vio-
lated the establishment clause;"5 the practice of employing a chap-
lain to open each legislative session with a prayer evinced an un-
questionably religious purpose and effect.7' Instead of using the
Lemon test, the Court relied on history to show both that the prac-
tice "ha[d] become part of the fabric of our society"7 7 and that the
framers who were familiar with the practice had found it to be "no
real threat" to the establishment clause.78 It was significant that
67. 374 U.S. at 226; 370 U.S. at 434.
68. Leo Pfeffer gave a colorful description of the community reaction to the school
prayer cases. L. PFEFFER, supra note 21, at 201-02, 209-10. Phillip Johnson made the com-
mon sense observation that one's concept of neutrality depends on what "advantages or
disadvantages" one thinks religion should have. Johnson, supra note 30, at 828-29.
69. R. MORGAN, supra note 21, at 134.
70. 374 U.S. at 222.
71. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
72. 104 S. Ct. 1355.
73. For analysis and discussion of other establishment clause cases, see R. MORGAN,
supra note 21; L. PFEFFER, supra note 23; F. SORAUF, supra note 21; L. TRiE, supra note 33.
74. Marsh, 463 U.S. 783. The Court had failed to use the Lemon test on one other
occasion, but in that case the Court found that religious discrimination warranted strict
scrutiny. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982).
75. Johnson, supra note 30, at 286.
76. The circuit court applied the Lemon test and found the employment of the chap-
lain violated all three parts of the Lemon test. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786.
77. Id. at 792.
78. Id. at 791.
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six Justices chose to avoid Lemon rather than invalidate the mani-
festly religious practice. If not for Lynch v. Donnelly, Marsh could
have been regarded as a simple refusal to override a venerable
79
In Lynch, however, the Court again referred to the tradition of
government-employed chaplains, this time to justify a reading of
the establishment clause which would accommodate the practice of
setting up a creche on city property, as part of a Christmas dis-
play.80 Supported by appropriate rhetoric from prior cases,"1 the
Court found that "accommodation of religious belief [was] in-
tended by the Framers.""2 Lynch was an extension of the rationale
of Marsh. In Marsh, the practice in question was validated by its
own long tradition; in Lynch, the practice was not validated by its
own tradition but by reference to other traditions." The Lynch
method proves too much; it could be used to validate any religious
practice.84
After deriving support from history and case law, the Lynch
Court reluctantly turned to the Lemon test.85 Before applying the
first prong of the test, which required a secular purpose, the Court
noted that to "[flocus exclusively on the religious component of
any activity would inevitably lead to its invalidation under the Es-
tablishment Clause."" Thus, "in the context of the Christmas Sea-
son," the Court found the celebration of the holiday and the depic-
79. Id. at 795 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (calling Marsh a "narrow" opinion with a "lim-
ited rationale" which would "pose little threat to the overall fate of the Establishment
Clause").
80. 104 S. Ct. 1355.
81. Id. at 1358-59.
82. 104 S. Ct. at 1359-60; Philip Kurland argued that the Burger Court has made a
"steady march toward reading the first amendment as a license for cooperation between
Church and state." Kurland, The Religion Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U.L.
REv. 1, 15 (1984).
83. Besides the chaplain tradition, the Court cited, inter alia, religious paintings in gov-
ernment-supported museums as evidence of the government accommodation of religion. 104
S. Ct. at 1360-61 (citations omitted).
84. Justice Brennan, in dissenting, calls this a "careless decision" because:
prior cases have all recognized that the "illumination" provided by history must
always be focused on the particular practice at issue in a given case. Without
that guiding principle and the intellectual discipline it imposes, the Court is at
sea, free to select random elements of America's varied history solely to suit the
views of five Members of this Court.
104 S. Ct. at 1386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
85. The Lemon test might be "useful," the Court said, but the Court will not "be con-




tion of its origins were legitimate secular purposes.87 As one
commentator put it, the Court thus legitimized as secular the very
acts necessary to the "appropriation of a particular religion or faith
as a practice of government." 8
When it applied the second prong of the Lemon test, which
asks whether a government practice has the primary effect of ad-
vancing or inhibiting religion, the Court in Lynch made compari-
sons with other cases and found that the city-displayed creche was
no "more beneficial" and no "more an endorsement of religion"
than government actions in other establishment clause cases." In
fact, the Court said, any benefit to religion was "indirect, remote
and incidental." 90 The dissent viewed the Court's decision as a
"struggle to ignore the clear religious effect of the creche." 91
Finally, the Court analyzed the display of the creche in terms
of the third prong of the Lemon test to determine whether it ex-
cessively entangled government with religion.2 The Court found
no violation of the administrative entanglement branch of the
prong: the cost of the creche was minimal, the maintenance was
nonexistent, and church officials had not been consulted about the
display." With regard to the second branch, political divisiveness,
the Court first denied its relevancy to the case and then found that
the creche display did not promote political divisiveness. 4
The Lynch majority's reluctant, perfunctory use of the Lemon
test cast doubt on the future usefulness of the test.9 5 Justice
O'Connor's opinion reinforced the doubt because she questioned
the relationship between the Lemon test and the principles of the
establishment clause,9 and proffered her own replacement test. 7
87. Id.
88. Van Alstyne, supra note 22, at 786.
89. 104 S. Ct. at 1363.
90. Id. at 1364.
91. Id. at 1376 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 1364.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1364-65. The Court noted that this branch of the excessive entanglement
prong was relevant only in cases involving "a direct subsidy to church-sponsored schools or
colleges, or other religious institutions." Id. (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 403 n.11
(1983)).
95. See Recent Developments, supra note 56, at 1188.
96. 104 S. Ct. at 1366-67.
97. Justice O'Connor's test has two parts:
[First whether] excessive entanglement with religious institutions, which may in-
terfere with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to
government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the
religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious
1985]
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Even Justice Brennan, who wrote the dissent, noted that "no sin-
gle formula can ever fully capture the analysis that may be neces-
"198sary to resolve difficult Establishment Clause problems ....
Marsh and Lynch thus set the stage for further reassessment, or
possibly rejection, of the Lemon test.
III. THE CASE OF Wallace v. Jaffree
The controversial school prayer issue, the complex analysis of
the establishment clause, and the recent case law explain Jaffree's
analytic and substantive importance. Against this complex and
troubled background, the emphatic simplicity of the Jaffree opin-
ion was the message. The Court's answer to the increasing contro-
versy in establishment clause cases over both prayer in schools and
mode of analysis was to unequivocally reassert "the criteria devel-
oped over a period of many years.""9 In clarifying any misconcep-
tions left by Marsh and Lynch, the Court demonstrated its unwill-
ingness to scrap the Lemon test.
A. Analysis
Before the Supreme Court applied the Lemon test to the Ala-
bama statute, and after it noted that its affirmance of the court of
appeals decision made "it unnecessary to comment at length on
the District Court's remarkable conclusion that the Federal Consti-
tution imposed no obstacle to Alabama's establishment of a state
religion," 100 the Court used half of a brief opinion to unqualifiedly
reassert its commitment to the incorporation doctrine as it applied
to the first amendment. 101
The Court then turned to the Lemon test, never getting past
the first prong: "no consideration of the second or third criteria
was necessary if a statute did not have a clearly secular pur-
pose. 102 The Court discovered the purpose behind section 16-1-
lines. The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or
disapproval of religion.
104 S. Ct. at 1366 (citation omitted).
98. 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2. Justice Brennan also said the Lemon test has been the "fun-
damental tool of Establishment Clause analyses." Id.
99. 105 S. Ct. at 2489.
100. Id. at 2479, 2486. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion for the majority joined by
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell.
101. Id. at 2486. Robert Cord and Raoul Berger are two of the constitutional scholars
relied upon by the district court for its finding that nothing in the Constitution impeded a
state from establishing a religion. R. CORD, supra note 21; R. BERGER, supra note 52.
102. 105 S. Ct. at 2490 (footnote omitted).
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20.1103 from the words of the bill's sponsor, the failure of the state
to suggest a secular purpose, and from a textual comparison of sec-
tion 16-1-20.1 with its predecessor, section 16-1-20.104 The sponsor
of the bill had stated for the Alabama legislative record, and testi-
fied to the district court, that his purpose was "to return voluntary
prayer to our public schools. ' 10 5 Chief Justice Burger, in dissent,
justifiably criticized this part of the discussion of legislative pur-
pose, because the statements were made only after passage of sec-
tion 16-1-20.1, with no indication that other legislators shared the
sponsor's motives. 06
The Court, however, did not rely primarily on the sponsor's
statements or the failure of Alabama to provide a secular pur-
pose.10 7 From textual comparison of section 16-1-20 with section
16-1-20.1, the Court found the latter section had a "wholly reli-
gious character."' 08 The addition of the words "or voluntary
prayer" was unnecessary, the Court said; the right to voluntary
prayer was already incorporated into section 16-1-20, without the
express language. 0 9 Noting the absence of any identifiable secular
purpose not fully served by section 16-1-20, the Court reasoned
that the enactment of section 16-1-20.1 was either a meaningless
exercise or an attempt "to convey a message of State endorsement
and promotion of prayer."" 0 Because it was unlikely to have been
a meaningless exercise, the Court concluded that it was a deliber-
ate expression of state support for voluntary prayer "as a favored
103. Section 16-1-20.1 provides:
At the commencement of the first class of each day in all grades in all public
schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such class is held may
announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minute in duration shall be
observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period no
other activities shall be engaged in.
Id.
104. 105 S. Ct. at 2490-91; § 16-1-20 provides:
At the commencement of the first class each day in the first through the sixth
grades in all public schools, the teacher in charge of the room in which each such
class is held shall announce that a period of silence, not to exceed one minute in
duration, shall be observed for meditation, and during any such period silence
shall be maintained and no activities engaged in.
Id.
105. 105 S. Ct. at 2490 n.43 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 50).
106. 105 S. Ct. at 2506 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Both Justice Powell and Justice
O'Connor remarked upon the same flaw in the majority's analysis. 105 S. Ct. at 2495 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring); 105 S. Ct. at 2501 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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practice."11
Tangential to the Court's Lemon analysis, but crucial to the
Court's purpose, footnote forty-five is worthy of special notice. Re-
sponding to arguments that the Alabama statute was "a permissi-
ble accommodation of religion, 11 2 the Court characterized these
arguments as based on the free exercise clause. Because there was
''no governmental practice impeding students from silently praying
for one minute at the beginning of each school day," the Court
found that the free exercise clause did not mandate accommoda-
tion. " 3 The Court refused to even acknowledge the possibility of
accommodation when not mandated by the free exercise clause."4
By this refusal, the Court strengthened the Lemon test because it
limited the accommodation policy which qualifies the test.
The Court, in conclusion, defended its one-prong analysis,
supporting its own finding of an apparent intent to endorse reli-
gion with similar findings from the district court and the court of
appeals." 5 The Court acknowledged that this could be treated as
''an inconsequential case involving nothing more than a few words
of symbolic speech.""' 6 At the same time the Court insisted that
the principle of government neutrality toward religion was too im-
portant to allow this violation to be overlooked." 7 Chief Justice
Burger disagreed, criticizing the majority opinion for failing "to
distinguish between real threat and mere shadow.""' 8
Justice O'Connor defended the fine line, distinguishing school
prayer cases from other establishment clause cases based on the
coercion inherent in the school setting and the susceptibility of
children to "unwilling religious indoctrination."" 9 The majority
opinion made the same point, 20 which left the impression that
111. Id. at 2492. The Court was probably influenced by the third statute, § 16-1-20.2,
which authorized teachers to lead "willing students" in a state-composed prayer, but could
not use a post hoc event as evidence of a religious purpose. See supra note 7 for the com-
plete text of § 16-1-20.2. Justice Powell admitted that the third statute influenced his think-
ing: "My concurrence is prompted by Alabama's persistence in attempting to institute state-
sponsored prayer in the public schools by enacting three successive statutes." 105 S. Ct. at
2493 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 2491 n.45.
113. Id.
114. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
115. 105 S. Ct. at 2493.
116. Id. at 2492.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2508. (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Goldberg's concurring opin-
ion in Schempp, 374 U.S. at 308).
119. Id. at 2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
120. Id. at 2492 nn.50 & 51.
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school prayer cases call for more rigorous application of the Lemon
test than other establishment clause cases.
B. Significance
Supreme Court watchers eagerly awaited Wallace v. Jaffree
because the Court would be responding to an issue of major politi-
cal importance after an apparent shift in the Court's direction.
Jaffree was the answer to two questions: (1) Would the Court dis-
pense with the Lemon test in favor of an analytical mode more
suited to accommodation? and (2) Would the Supreme Court find
a moment of silence constitutional? The answer to the first ques-
tion was unequivocal, and made the answer to the second question
inevitable in the particular factual circumstance.
The Court affirmed the use of the Lemon test as appropriate
analysis for establishment clause cases, neither criticizing nor re-
sponding to criticism of the test. Subsequent cases have dispelled
the impression that the rehabilitation of Lemon was occasioned by
the school prayer issue, 2' but Jaffree's significance is nevertheless
limited by its peculiar facts and analysis. To begin with, the
Court's use of the Lemon test gave little guidance for the applica-
tion of a tripartite test already described as "problematic.' ' 12 The
one-prong analysis offered no hint of how to apply the other two
prongs to a moment of silence statute. This is particularly note-
worthy in light of the Court's statement that "[a]ppelants have not
identified any secular purpose that was not fully served by section
16-1-20 before the enactment of section 16-1-20.1.'''2 The implica-
tion is that the Court finds some secular purpose in a "pure" mo-
ment of silence statute. Thus the failure to describe the Lemon
inquiry for the other two prongs becomes a noticeable omission.
2 4
121. Three establishment clause cases decided after Jaffree, none of which involved
school prayer, all used the Lemon test: Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (use of
federal funds to send remedial, clinical, and guidance personnel into private schools violated
establishment clause); School Dist. v. Ball, 105 S. Ct. 3216 (1985) ("shared time" and com-
munity education programs violated establishment clause); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,
Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985) (Connecticut statute providing employees with an absolute right
not to work on their chosen Sabbath violated establishment clause).
122. 105 S. Ct. at 2496 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). See also supra notes
53-54 and accompanying text.
123. 105 S. Ct. at 2491.
124. The two concurring Justices were less reticent about expressing their opinions on
whether moment of silence statutes would pass the other two prongs. Justice Powell said
that a "straightforward" moment of silence statute would pass both the effect and entangle-
ment prongs. Id. at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor did not discuss the en-
tanglement prong but found that the moment of silence statutes "of many States should
19851
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Within the one-prong analysis, the Jaffree decision is limited
by the unusual factual circumstance of two statutes that, only
when read together, evidenced a legislative intent to endorse reli-
gion. 125 Furthermore, the passage of three school prayer statutes
and the failure of the state to proffer a secular purpose indicate a
desire of Alabama officials to score political points rather than to
have a moment of silence in public schools. Unsurprisingly, the re-
sultant statute is perceived as a violation of the establishment
clause.1 26 The Jaffree decision responds accordingly, but offers no
advice on how to deal with a more subtle set of circumstances.
It would have been particularly helpful if the Court had dis-
cussed the level of scrutiny to apply to legislative intent in these
cases. It is impossible to tell from Jaffree whether the Court would
recommend its customary "reluctance to attribute unconstitutional
motives to the states, particularly when a plausible secular purpose
• . . may be discerned from the face of the statute,1 l 7 or whether
the Court would recommend a stricter standard. In a recent school
religion case, the Court held that a "self-serving" recitation of sec-
ular purpose would "not be sufficient to avoid conflict with the
First Amendment." 128 Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent, discussed
the problem of how to define the secular purpose prong: "The pur-
pose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to express
any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references . ... ,, On
the other hand, he said, if the purpose prong requires "an absence
of any intent to aid sectarian institutions," then many previously
approved measures would be unconstitutional. 130
While the majority in Jaffree uncritically used the Lemon test,
they have at other times been critical of it. In 1977, Justice Ste-
vens, the author of Jaffree, advocated abandonment of Lemon and
satisfy the Establishment Clause standard we have here applied." Id. at 2505 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
125. See supra note 7 (the third statute, § 16-1-20.2, makes the total picture even more
damning).
126. Professor John E. Sexton of the New York University School of Law felt that Ala-
bama "was thumbing its nose at the court [sic]." Lauter, Major Shift Looming In Church-
State Law, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 10, 1984, at 26, col 4.
127. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
128. Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (per curiam). A Kentucky statute, which
required a copy of the Ten Commandments to be posted in every public classroom, was
unconstitutional despite fine print on the copy which referred to the secular nature of the
Ten Commandments as fundamental law. Id.
129. 105 S. Ct. at 2517 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
130. Id. See infra note 145 and accompanying text.
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a return to the Everson standard.131 More recently, Justice Powell,
who wrote separately in Jaffree in support of Lemon, 32 was part of
the majority, which included Justice Blackmun, that quite will-
ingly accepted the superficial use of the test in Lynch and the fail-
ure to use it at all in Marsh. Even more telling of the Court's com-
mitment to Lemon was Justice Brennan's dissent in Lynch, joined
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, in which Justice
Brennan expressed dissatisfaction with the adaptability of any test
to these complex issues.13 3 Justice Brennan also proposed his own
test from Schempp as more responsive to the difficulties of the es-
tablishment clause.13 4 Having been a part of the general criticism
of the Lemon test in Lynch, the Jaf]ree majority's uncritical, un-
qualified reliance on Lemon bespeaks a desire to avoid chaos by
uniting behind Lemon until the Court can agree on an authorita-
tive alternative.135 The Court may be concerned, as Justice Powell
observed, that "continued criticism of [the Lemon test] could en-
courage other courts to feel free to decide Establishment Clause
cases on an ad hoc basis. "136
Because Lemon thus could be a stop gap measure, the ques-
tion of a successor arises. The Jaffree decision indicates the proba-
ble success of several potential alternatives. First, Jaffree makes it
clear that a majority of the Court will only support Chief Justice
Burger's "official Chaplain" brand of historical analysis for a lim-
ited type of case.'3 7 Second, Jaffree also makes it clear that a ma-
jority of the Court is not yet willing to adopt Justice Rehnquist's
suggestion to abandon the test as based on faulty history. 38 Third,
131. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 265-66 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring and
dissenting).
132. 105 S. Ct. at 2493-94 (Powell, J., concurring).
133. 104 S. Ct. at 1371 n.2; see supra note 98 and accompanying text.
134. 104 S. Ct. at 1375 n.11.
135. See Ball, 105 S. Ct. at 3222 (1985). Justice Brennan writing for the Court in this
later case reaffirmed the use of Lemon, but noted the limitations of the test in not affording
"precise limits." Id. (quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359 (1975)).
136. 105 S. Ct. at 2494 (Powell, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
137. In Marsh, five Justices found Chief Justice Burger's reasoning persuasive. In
Lynch, only four Justices joined Chief Justice Burger. In Lynch, Justice Powell had joined
Chief Justice Burger, but Justice Powell's commitment to Lemon is unequivocal in Jafree.
138. In Jaffree, Justice White agreed with Justice Rehnquist: "[I]t would be quite un-
derstandable if we undertook to reassess our cases dealing with these clauses, particularly
those dealing with the Establishment Clause." 105 S. Ct. at 2508 (White, J., dissenting).
Chief Justice Burger already uses history to reassess these cases. Justice O'Connor sympa-
thized with this point, but noted the limitations of seeking the intent of the framers, and
emphasized school prayer cases as distinguishable. Id. at 2502-03 (O'Connor, J., concurring
in the judgment).
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the Court, while supplementing Lemon with Justice O'Connor's
endorsement test,139 will not go so far as to use it as a replacement
for Lemon." 0
Finally, Jaffree indicates the Court's current position on the
policy of accommodation, which offers a possible qualification of
Lemon rather than providing an alternative. In footnote forty-five,
the Court limits accommodation to situations in which the govern-
ment has burdened the free exercise of religion,' 4 1 and thereby
halts the recent expansion of the policy.
" 2
It is difficult to be certain of the Court's intention on the sub-
stantive issue, and it is impossible to even guess how the Court
intended to reconcile this substantive issue with the chosen analyt-
ical method. The majority in Jaffree found that "[the legislative
intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course, quite
different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in
voluntary prayer during an appropriate moment of silence during
the school day."' 43 The Court's evident approbation of a moment
of silence is not consistent with a rigorous use of the Lemon test.
Through moment of silence statutes, legislators were attempting to
maintain some vestige of a popular religious practice without run-
ning afoul of the Court's ban on vocal school prayers.144 Therefore,
moment of silence statutes could only be found constitutional if
the Court were willing to accept a pro forma recitation of secular
purpose.' 4 ' The Jaffree Court's suggestion that some moment of
silence statutes are constitutional thus presents the conundrum of
139. See supra note 97 for the text of the test.
140. The Court, in Jaffree, used Justice O'Connor's language, but continued at the
same time to look for a secular purpose to satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test. 105 S.
Ct. at 2490-93.
141. 105 S. Ct. at 2491 n.45; see supra notes 44-47, 82 and accompanying text.
142. The shift to accommodation found substantial support from the Reagan admin-
stration. Lauter, supra note 126, at 1, col 3.
143. 105 S. Ct. at 2491. Justice O'Connor, in Jaffree, explicitly confirmed the accepta-
bility of a moment of silence statute. Id. at 2500 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Justice Powell explicitly agreed. Id. at 2495 (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
and Justices White and Rehnquist approved of the Alabama statute as presented.
144. L. PFEFFER, supra note 23, at 204-05; see also The Unconstitutionality of State
Statutes Authorizing Moments of Silence in the Public Schools, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1874
(1983); Note, Daily Moments of Silence in Public Schools: A Constitutional Analysis, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 364 (1983).
145. Justice O'Connor wrote a great deal on this issue attempting to explain the utility
of the purpose prong when the inquiry into legislative motive should be "deferential and
limited." 105 S. Ct. at 2500. Basically, she concluded that the benefit is that it will remind
governments not to say that they are endorsing religion. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
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how to explain constitutionality when the rigorous use of the
Lemon test militates for unconstitutionality." ' Furthermore, if
courts are to accept some evidence of secular purpose, how are
they to decide which evidence is sufficient, or appropriate? The
school-aid cases have already illustrated that the Lemon test is not
a useful vehicle for subtle distinctions.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although it is clear that the Court in Wallace v. Jaffree is
mandating the use of the Lemon test for the establishment clause,
it is unclear how the Court means for the test to be applied to a
moment of silence statute. For the twenty-five states that already
have a moment of silence statute, 47 and for those states that may
desire one, Justice O'Connor's lengthy discussion of which statutes
should be found to be constitutional might prove more helpful. 4"
The majority opinion says only what it must to legitimize its find-
ing that Alabama's statute is unconstitutional. On the difficult is-
sues that these statutes raise, the majority, for the moment, is
silent.
SYLVIA SOHN PENNEYS*
146. Prior to Jaffree, four federal courts had ruled on moment of silence statutes. The
Massachusetts district court, in 1976, was the only court that found a legitimate secular
purpose. Gaines v. Anderson, 421 F. Supp. 337, 346 (D. Mass. 1976). The court hypothesized
a secular purpose that would serve an educative purpose: "The legislature could reasonably
believe that students tend to learn greater self-discipline and respect for the authority of the
teacher from a required moment of silence." d. at 342.
A district court in Tennessee, in 1982, held that the intent was religious, that "no other
purpose is apparent which substantially influenced the legislature. ... Beck v. McElrath,
548 F. Supp. 1161, 1164 (M.D. Tenn. 1982). In 1983, two more district courts looked for a
secular purpose. The New Mexico court found that "enhanc[ing] discipline and instill[ing]
in the students. . . 'intellectual composure. . .' [were] clearly the product of afterthought
... It is unlikely that the moment of silence carries any significant benefits to the educa-
tional process ...." Duffy v. Las Cruces Pub. Schools, 557 F. Supp. 1013, 1016 (D.N.M.
1983). Finally, the New Jersey district court found that "[a]ll the evidence points to the
religious intent of this enactment," which was "all the more apparent in light of the pretex-
ual nature of the secular purpose .... " May v. Cooperman, 572 F. Supp. 1561, 1572
(D.N.J. 1983).
These district court opinions are worth noting for two reasons. First, out of four deci-
sions, three courts found no secular purpose. Second, the only court that did find a secular
purpose was using a very relaxed standard of scrutiny; the court hypothesized the secular
purpose. The other three courts found it very easy to look through the proferred secular
purpose as mere camouflage for an obviously religious practice.
147. See 105 S. Ct. at 2498 & n.1 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
148. 105 S. Ct. at 2498-99 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
* For those who have taught me, and for the two special people that I have taught-
Anne Catherine and James Matthew Penneys.
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